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METHOD AND INTELLECTUAL CONVERSION
Msgr. Richard M. Liddy

In this book we have focused on a generalized empirical method (GEM) underlying the various
disciplines: history, art, economics, science, mathematics, theology, etc. We have emphasized
the fact that GEM, lucidly articulated by Bernard Lonergan, is an invariant method underlying all
other methods.
In brief, underpinning special methods there is what I have named generalized
empirical method. Its operations are the operations we can verify each in his own
consciousness. And the normative pattern that relates these operations to one
another is the conscious dynamism of sensitive spontaneity, of intelligence raising
questions and demanding satisfactory answers, of reasonableness insisting on
sufficient evidence before it can assent yet compelled to assent when sufficient
evidence is forthcoming, of conscience presiding over all and revealing to the
subject his authenticity or his unauthenticity as he observes or violates the
immanent norms of his own sensitivity, his own intelligence, his own
reasonableness, his own freedom and responsibility. 1
To realize this dynamic structure is to come to understand the nature of our own minds. It is what
Lonergan in his Insight: A Study of Human Understanding calls “self-appropriation.” In this
article I would like to emphasize the fact that such a process of self-appropriation has the
character of a “conversion.” It is a dimension of that basic human process of coming out of the
darkness into the light: in Cardinal Newman’s words, ex umbris et imaginibus in veritatem –
from the shadows and images into the truth.
Conversion is a fundamental term in Lonergan’s Method in Theology. There he distinguishes
the three levels of intellectual, moral and religious conversion.2 Religious conversion is a basic
“falling in love with God.” It is illustrated by St. Paul being knocked off his horse as well as by
other more gradual transformations of the saints in history. Moral conversion is a transformation
from living one’s life on the basis of pleasures and pains to living on the basis of values. It is a
movement to doing the good that previously one did not want to do. Finally, intellectual
conversion is a basic break from a naïve view of oneself and of reality. It is the transition to
understanding oneself as a source of meaning and of knowledge as attained by the intellectual
acts of understanding and true judgment. In this article we will: 1) give a general description of
intellectual conversion; 2) give an example of it in the life of Saint Augustine; 3) show its
relevance to understanding modern science; 4) show its connection to understanding belief and
human dignity; and 5) conclude with some comments on facilitating intellectual conversion in
our day. .
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1. What is intellectual conversion?
So why would the process of self-appropriation, of getting in touch with and coming to know the
structure of our own consciousness – the general empirical method -be a process of conversion?
What is it a conversion “from?” and what is it “to?”
Basically, coming to know the generalized empirical method is a conversion because it is a
process of cutting through long ingrained habits of thinking, habits that cut us off from our true
selves and from reality. Self-appropriation is a process of making a radical break with a
spontaneous and implicit understanding of who we are and how our minds relate to reality.
Lonergan describes the general character of this implicit but inadequate vision of our own minds
and their relationship to reality in his description of intellectual conversion in Method in
Theology.
Intellectual conversion is a radical clarification and, consequently, the elimination
of an exceedingly stubborn and misleading myth concerning reality, objectivity,
and knowledge. The myth is that knowing is like looking, that objectivity is
seeing what is there to be seen and not seeing what is not there, and that the real is
out there now to be looked at.3
In the introduction to his Insight Lonergan speaks of this persistent myth as a “psychological
problem.” Without this problem, he avers, he could set out quite clearly what human knowing is.
Nevertheless, the fact is that people begin their quest to know their own minds burdened with the
basic misconception that there is only one type of knowing while there are really two. These two
different types of knowing coexist confusedly in the human person and the aim of Lonergan’s
Insight is to help people to come to identify and explicitly distinguish between these two types of
knowing.
This confusion between two types of knowing leads easily to an empiricist or materialist
philosophy that knowing consists in “taking a good look,” that objectivity means “seeing what is
there to be seen and not seeing what is not there,” and reality is “already out there now” - often
designated with gestures toward the world “out there.” To put it briefly, we think of ourselves as
“a blob,” “a bump on a log,” and we pay no attention to the wonder of our own thinking. If
thinking is anything, it is just another instance of the “already out there now real.” We often
reduce ourselves and our thinking to the status of the material objects around us. And we are not
alone. Many of our contemporaries, including philosophers, do likewise.
So what is the alternative? What is the world toward which intellectual conversion brings one?
Well, for one, it is the world mediated by acts of “meaning:” that is, acts beyond the sensitive
acts of looking, touching, tasting, imagining, etc.: acts such as questioning, understanding,
reflecting, weighing the evidence, judging, evaluating, deciding, believing. All these latter acts
introduce one into what Lonergan calls “the world mediated by meaning.” It is a world of
relationality beyond the empirical world of immediacy. Continuing the quote from, Lonergan
notes:
Now this myth overlooks the distinction between the world of immediacy, say,
the world of the infant and, on the other hand, the world mediated by meaning.
The world of immediacy is the sum of what is seen, heard, touched, tasted, smelt,
felt. It conforms well enough to the myth's view of reality, objectivity,
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knowledge. But it is but a tiny fragment of the world mediated by meaning. For
the world mediated by meaning is a world known not by the sense experience of
an individual but by the external and internal experience of the cultural
community, and by the continuously checked and rechecked judgments of the
community. Knowing, accordingly, is not just seeing; it is experiencing,
understanding, judging and believing. The criteria of objectivity are not just the
criteria of ocular vision; they are the compounded criteria of experiencing, of
understanding, of judging, and of believing. The reality known is not just looked
at; it is given in experience, organized and extrapolated by understanding, posited
by judgment and belief.4
I remember once waiting outside a bank while a friend went inside to deposit some checks and to
conduct some other business. As I sat there waiting, I reflected on what a bank is in its
relationship to the whole banking system, a system of mutual understandings – we take these
pieces of paper to be worth such and such and hopefully they are accepted as such by others. The
whole financial system is a network of understandings, judgments and beliefs stretching out
beyond the immediate bank, which I could see with my eyes, to a financial system that spans the
globe.
And so there is the negative side of intellectual conversion which Plato sought to communicate
through his image of prisoners chained in a cave, locked into a world of images projected by the
light of a fire on the opposite wall. Today we would speak of these prisoners as “couchpotatoes,” experts in TV and video games, experts in the images flashing on the wall in front of
them, but oblivious to the real world beyond the cave. That is what intellectual conversion is
from.
But what is it to? What is the positive side to the painful process of self-appropriation and
becoming free of the cave? Just as the person forced out of the cave begins to see the world as it
is, so intellectual conversion opens one up to a whole new notion of who we are, of what our
objective knowledge is, and what reality is. Instead of conceiving of ourselves as bumps on a
log, and our minds as just “a black box” with in-put through the senses and output in speech,
intellectual conversion introduces us to ourselves as headed for “being,” for all that is. Being is
the “x” that we seek through our acts of questioning, understanding and accurate judging. Of
course, we only partially reach being, but we come to know what we know within the horizon of
all that we are seeking to know, the universe in all its concreteness – the fullness of being.
An appreciation for such a world of meaning and being includes an appreciation for the “long
chains of reasoning” that lead us beyond what is merely apparent to what is so. It leads us to
appreciate the worlds that the scientist and historian discover and that the philosopher slowly
comes to realize. Intellectual conversion moves us from a philosophy that is materialist – fixated
on the “already out there now real” – through an idealism or “spiritualist” philosophy that tends
to conceive reality in material terms – to a critical realism that conceives human knowing in its
own spiritual terms and reality as attained by such knowing. We will illustrate this in our next
section through the example of Augustine.
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Lonergan once wrote of the various ways in which we can miss the reality of our very self.
There is, for example, “the neglected subject” who is so fascinated by the transcendence of truth
as to forget that truth exists in minds. Or “the truncated subject,” for whom the reality of one’s
self can be beyond the horizon of one’s self. For such a person there can be a major disconnect
between what one thinks one is and what one truly is. The elimination of such inadequate
positions is not easy.
The transition from the neglected and truncated subject to self-appropriation is not
a simple matter. It is not just a matter of finding out and assenting to a number of
true propositions. More basically, it is a matter of conversion, of a personal
philosophic experience, of moving out of a world of sense and of arriving, dazed
and disoriented for a while, into a universe of being.5
2. Augustine
Such was Augustine’s experience as he recounts in the Confessions. Becoming a member of the
cult of the Manichees as a young adult, he bought into their materialist spirituality and could
only think of immaterial realities such as “God” in a bodily way.
Though I did not even then think of You under the shape of a human body, yet I
could not but think of You as some corporeal substance, occupying all space,
whether infused in the world, or else diffused through infinite space beyond the
world (VII, 1, 1).6
When I desired to think of my God, I could not think of him save as a bodily
magnitude - for it seemed to me that what was not such was nothing at all: this
indeed was the principal and practically the sole cause of my inevitable error (V,
10, 19).
Under the influence of the Manichees, Augustine even imagined evil as a type of bodily
substance, another principle opposed to the good God.
I did not know that evil has no being of its own but is only an absence of good, so
that it simply is not. How indeed should I see this, when the sight of my eyes saw
no deeper than bodies and the sight of my soul no deeper than the images of
bodies? (III, 7, 12)
In my ignorance I thought of evil not simply as some kind of substance, but
actually as a bodily substance, because I had not learned to think of mind save as
a more subtle body, extended in space (V, 10, 20).
The philosophical issue, as he slowly began to realize, was the character of his own mind.
My mind was in search of such images as the forms of my eye was accustomed to
see; and I did not realize that the mental act by which I formed these images, was
not itself a bodily image (VII, 1, 2).
Slowly Augustine began to believe not only in the unseen, but in the totally different character of
such reality, which he identified as veritas, truth. He came to that position through a struggle of a
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number of years during which he tried one philosophy or life-view after another. Yet through it
all there was a power at work in him leading him to desire and seek and search for veritas, no
matter where it might be found. Thus, at the age of nineteen, he tells us, he happened upon
Cicero’s Hortensius, where he discovered a new dimension of desire.
Quite definitely it changed the direction of my mind...Suddenly all the vanity I
had hoped in I saw as worthless, and with an incredible intensity of desire I
longed after inward wisdom. I had begun that journey upwards by which I was to
return to You...The one thing that delighted me in Cicero's exhortation was that I
should love, and seek, and win, and hold, and embrace, not this or that
philosophical school but Wisdom itself, whatever it might be. (III, 4, 7-8)
What the Hortensius represented for Augustine was a disinterested search for the truth, a desire
beyond party spirit that remained with him through the years as he moved from one philosophy
to another. Eventually becoming disillusioned with the fantastic myths of the Manichees,
Augustine was of a more or less skeptical frame of mind when, in the spring of 386, an
acquaintance lent him “some books of the Platonists.” These books were “packed with thought,"
(libri quidem pleni), and they produced in him a “conflagration.”7 What these books did for
Augustine was twofold: First, they explicitly “turned him inward” toward his own conscious
self. “Being admonished by all this to return to myself, I entered into my own depths…” (VII,
10, 16). Secondly, under the influence of this reading he began to think of “spirit” in its own
terms and not in bodily ways. He came to realize that his chief intellectual obstacle had been his
need to imaginatively "picture" things which cannot be pictured – whether his own mind, his
own being, reality, evil or God. In this Augustine represents for us the priority of “coming home”
to our own minds. As Lonergan points out:
The problem is not having people repeat with Augustine that “The real is not a
body, it is what you know when you know something true.” The problem is to get
people to mean as much as Augustine meant when Augustine spoke about truth.
And that is a transformation of the subject. It is bringing the subject up to the
level of thought of a Plato and an Aristotle and an Augustine and an Aquinas.
And that is a terrific development in the subject.8
Of course, Augustine experienced his great religious conversion later in that summer of 386. But
our point here is that that religious conversion was at least partially prepared for by his long
years of searching, his wrestling with his own mind and the breakthrough to veritas he had that
summer of 386 when he read “a few books of the Platonists.”
3. Science
Our contemporary world is peopled by numerous “pundits” pontificating from the right and from
the left on every conceivable cultural topic. Among them generally there is one authority that is
constantly invoked, and that is “science.” Thus, “the new atheists,” who recently have
aggressively attacked all religion, invariably invoke science in defense of their positions.9 But
the question can be asked whether they have “science” right? Is science just a materialist
enterprise based on a materialist vision of human knowing and reality? Is their invocation of
quantum-physical or neurobiological processes haunted by “imaginable entities moving through
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imaginable processes in an imaginable space-time?” Or is science something more “spiritual,”
more rooted in the ceaseless questioning of the human spirit and in that spirit’s ability to
transcend the imagined?
St Augustine of Hippo narrates that it took him years to make the discovery that
the name “real” might have a different connotation from the name “body.” Or, to
bring the point nearer home, one might say that it has taken modern science four
centuries to make the discovery that the objects of its inquiry need not be
imaginable entities moving through imaginable processes in an imaginable spacetime. The fact that a Plato attempted to communicate through his dialogues, the
fact that an Augustine eventually learnt from the writers whom, rather generically,
he refers to as Platonists, has lost its antique flavor and its apparent irrelevance to
the modern mind. Even before Einstein and Heisenberg it was clear enough that
the world described by scientists was strangely different from the world depicted
by artists and inhabited by men of common sense. But it was left to twentiethcentury physicists to envisage the possibility that the objects of their science were
to be reached only by severing the umbilical cord that tied them to the maternal
imagination of man.10
Has not every scientific breakthrough involved some conversion from imagined reality? “Every
scientific or philosophic breakthrough is the elimination of some myth in the pejorative sense;
the flat earth, right on…”11 Genuine science, then, involves an implicit intellectual conversion,
the movement from an imagined way of looking at things to a truer, more accurate, intellectual
apprehension of things – often expressed in mathematical notations and theoretical language.
Such notations and language have the effect of moving us away from the world as related to our
senses toward an apprehension of the world in which things are related to each other in a
universal perspective.12
Since science involves this implicit intellectual conversion, why can there not be a conversion in
one’s understanding of science itself? That is, in our understanding of our human mind as
functioning scientifically? This is the point of Lonergan’s Insight: A Study of Human
Understanding with its extended examples and explanations of scientific understanding as
distinct from what people – even scientists – imagine science to be.
The problem set by the two types of knowing is, then, not a problem of
elimination but a problem of critical distinction. For the difficulty lies, not in
either type of knowing by itself, but in the confusion that arises when one shifts
unconsciously from one type to the other. Animals have no epistemological
problems. Neither do scientists as long as they stick to their task of observing,
forming hypotheses, and verifying. The perennial source of nonsense is that, after
the scientist has verified his hypothesis, he is likely to go a little further and tell
the layman what, approximately, scientific reality looks like!13
The physicist, Freeman Dyson, once described the process involved in his students learning
quantum mechanics. It involves three stages.
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The student begins by learning the tricks of the trade. He learns how to make
calculations in quantum mechanics and get the right answers...To learn the
mathematics of the subject and to learn how to use it takes about six months. This
is the first stage in learning quantum mechanics, and it is comparatively easy and
painless. The second stage comes when the student begins to worry because he
does not understand what he has been doing. He worries because he has no clear
physical picture in his head. He gets confused in trying to arrive at a physical
explanation for each of the mathematical tricks he has been taught. He works
very hard and gets discouraged because he does not seem able to think clearly.
This second stage often lasts six months or longer, and it is strenuous and
unpleasant. Then, quite unexpectedly, the third stage begins. The student
suddenly says to himself, "I understand quantum mechanics," or rather he says, "I
understand now that there really isn't anything to be understood."14
In other words, the student comes to understand that there really isn’t anything to be understood
in the “clear physical pictures” she had been seeking. Certainly the student has been learning
something – quantum mechanics – but at the same time she comes to understand that that
learning involves “unlearning something,” that is, one’s spontaneous anticipations about reality.
And that can be a painful process. In a more contemporary language, one ceases to consider
knowing to be merely experiencing or having representative images and one comes to realize
that genuine knowledge consists in accurate understanding, true judgment and tested belief.
So self-appropriation, the appropriation of generalized empirical method, involves a conversion
from thinking of human knowing as modeled on human sensitive knowing and, on the other
hand, human knowing as properly human: as completing human sensitive experience through
such acts of meaning as questioning, understanding, judging, deciding, believing. In Insight
Lonergan notes that one has not yet made this breakthrough if one has no clear memory of its
“startling strangeness.”15
4. Human dignity
I began to consider the countless things I believed which I had not seen, or which
had happened with me not there - so many things in the history of nations, so
many facts about places and cities, which I had never seen, so many things told
me by friends, by doctors, by this man, by that man; and unless we accepted these
things, we should do nothing at all in this life. Most strongly of all it struck me
how firmly and unshakably I believed that I was born of a particular father and
mother, which I could not possibly know unless I believed it on the word of others
(VI, 5, 7).
The suppression of an accurate understanding of human understanding leads easily to a distortion
in scholars’ and scientists’ understanding of what they are doing when they are doing it. Such
distortion can easily lead to down-playing the spiritual acts of the human person – among which
the simple act of believing.
Human knowledge results from a vast collaboration of many peoples over
uncounted millennia. The necessary condition of that collaboration is belief. What
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any of us knows, only slightly results from personal experience, personal
discovery, personally conducted verification; for the most part it results from
believing. But the eighteenth-century Enlightenment was not content to attack
religious belief. It prided itself on its philosophers. It set up a rationalist
individualism that asked people to prove their assumptions or else regard them as
arbitrary. In effect it was out to destroy not only the religious tradition but all
tradition.16
Such disregard for the major role of belief in our coming to know seems also to have had its
effect on our modern theories of education.
Such rationalist individualism in the twentieth century seems to have infected our
educationalists. Students are encouraged to find things out for themselves, to
develop originality, to be creative, to criticize, but it does not seem that they are
instructed in the enormous role of belief in the acquisition and the expansion of
knowledge. Many do not seem to be aware that what they know of science is not
immanently generated but for the most part simply belief.17
So the intellectual conversion to understanding oneself can open one up to understanding all that
one does not know, but that one can penetrate into through believing others who we reasonably
judge to be credible.
So also, intellectual conversion can open one up to the great dignity that is the human person.
Without intellectual conversion, we can consider ourselves to be just “a bump on a log,” some
“body.”
Positivists, naturalists, behaviorists insist that human sciences have to be
conducted on the same lines as the natural sciences. But the resultant
apprehension of man, if not mechanistic, is theriomorphic [“like an animal”]. Nor
is this view of man as a machine or as an animal confined to some rarefied
academic realm. It is applied. The applications reach out into all departments of
thought and into all walks of life. They have the common feature of omitting advertence to human dignity and respect for human morality.
So there are vast and important implications of intellectual conversion, of arriving at an adequate
understanding of who we are as human beings.
5. The Process
This process of intellectual conversion is not an easy one and it is not something that happens
overnight. Indeed Lonergan says…
...the labor of self-appropriation cannot occur at a single leap. Essentially, it is a
development of the subject and in the subject, and like all development it can be
solid and fruitful only by being painstaking and slow.18
That this process involves a significant “mental wrestling,” is evident from what Lonergan would
write some years later in Method in Theology:
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Our purpose is to bring to light the pattern within which these operations occur
and, it happens, we cannot succeed without an exceptional amount of exertion and
activity on the part of the reader. He will have to familiarize himself with our
terminology. He will have to evoke the relevant operations in his own
consciousness. He will have to discover in his own experience the dynamic
relationships leading from one operation to the next. Otherwise he will find not
merely this chapter but the whole book about as illuminating as a blind man finds
a lecture on color.19
It took me a good year to work my own way through Insight and I documented that effort in
Startling Strangeness: Reading Lonergan’s Insight. But it was worth the effort. It was worth
working through all the “exercises” he sets out there in mathematics, physical science, the
relationships between the sciences and common sense, etc. For it introduced me to myself.
In brief, for intellectual self-transcendence a price must be paid. My little book
Insight provides a set of exercises for those who wish to find out what goes on in
their own black boxes. But it is only a set of exercises. What counts is doing
them. Should one attempt to do them? As long as one is content to be guided by
one's common sense, to disregard the pundits of every class whether scientific or
cultural or religious, one need not learn what goes on in one's own black box. But
when one moves beyond the limits of commonsense competence, when one
wishes to have an opinion of one's own on larger issues, then one had best know
just what one is doing. Otherwise, one too easily will be duped and too readily be
exploited. Then explicit intellectual self-transcendence can become a real need.20
Of course, just as moral conversion is not moral perfection, so also intellection conversion does
not necessarily mean that that conversion has penetrated into all one’s ways of thinking. There
can be vast areas of one’s mentality that have yet to be transformed. There can be real areas of
inconsistency. In one area intellectual conversion might have penetrated, but in another area one
can be a naïve realist, or an idealist or even a materialist. All of the above implicit or explicit
philosophies are derivatives of a primitive materialism that adheres to one’s thinking until one
makes an explicit break from it. As Lonergan puts it,
…[T]he problems in philosophy at least at the present time are not problems of
exploitation. They are problems of getting people to the starting point, problems
of opening up people’s minds and bringing them to fundamental truths on which
the system would rest. When you have got them there, you have practically got
them the whole way…21
In this, intellectual or philosophical conversion parallels religious conversion. Lonergan uses the
example of Cardinal Newman’s conversion to illustrate the point.
Conversion involves something of a leap. There is a pivot on which the
movement turns, but for the person to find just where the pivot is and to turn upon
it is not a simple matter. It will be hard to find as honest and sincere and direct a
soul as that of Cardinal Newman, but it took something like from eleven to
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fourteen years between the time when he first saw that Catholicism was perhaps
the truth and the time at which he was converted. It was sometime between 1831
and 1833, as I vaguely remember, that he first saw the light, and it was in 1844 or
1845 that he entered the Catholic Church. We cannot expect religious conversion
to occur overnight. Psychologically the same type of problem is involved in
philosophic conversion.22
In other words, when you undergo an intellectual conversion, when you get to know the
generalized empirical method underlying all other methods, when you get to know your own
mind, then you are almost all the way “home.”
We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.
(T. S. Eliot, Little Gidding)
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